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祖父は，バターン半島とコレヒドール島における戦闘期間の体験及び戦争捕虜としての体験を手記
に残したが，これに加えて，多量の他の資料も残した。その中に，捕虜輸送に関わった９人を裁い
た1947年横浜裁判の895ページにわたる裁判記録がある。この９人は，祖父を含む1,619人の捕虜が，
1944年12月13日に鴨緑丸でマニラを立ち，1945年１月30日にブラジル丸で門司に到着したまでの
期間の輸送を担当した。祖父は，その横浜裁判に自らは出廷しなかったが，証拠となった供述書を
送った。この裁判が本論文の題材である。
In	addition	to	his	manuscript	about	his	experiences	during	the	Bataan	and	Corregidor	campaign	and	
as	a	prisoner	of	war	(POW)	during	World	War	II,	my	grandfather	left	behind	a	stack	of	additional	
material,	including	an	895-page	transcript	of	the	1947	war	crimes	trial	of	nine	of	the	Japanese	men	
who	were	assigned	to	escort	 the	draft	of	1,619	POWs	that	 left	Manila	on	the	Oryoku	Maru	on	
December	13,	1944,	and	arrived	in	Moji	on	the	Brazil	Maru	on	January	30,	1945.	He	did	not	attend	
the	trial	in	Yokohama	in	person,	but	he	did	send	a	statement	that	was	submitted	as	evidence.	This	
trial	will	be	the	subject	of	this	article.	
On	the	transcript	of	the	trial	and	some	of	the	other	documents,	there	are	some	handwritten	
marks.	For	example,	on	p.	1	of	SCAP	File	No.	014.13,	the	following	sentence	is	underlined:	The	
Japanese	themselves	refused	to	keep	a	record	and	later	forced	an	American	medical	officer	to	sign	
more	than	a	thousand	death	warrants	to	the	effect	that	the	prisoners	had	succumbed	due	to	natural	
causes,	and	 in	the	 left	margin	there	 is	a	squiggle,	 the	word	“me,”	and	my	grandfather’s	 initials	
“CMS.”	I	have	no	sample	of	my	grandfather’s	handwriting,	but	it	is	very	likely	that	he	wrote	this	as	
he	read	the	pages	carefully	and	with	great	interest.
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1. International Military Tribunals
Article	10	of	the	Potsdam	Declaration	of	July	26,	1945,	stated	that:	
We	do	not	 intend	that	 the	Japanese	shall	be	enslaved	as	a	race	or	destroyed	as	a	
nation,	but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those 
who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.	The	Japanese	Government	shall	
remove	all	obstacles	to	the	revival	and	strengthening	of	democratic	tendencies	among	
the	Japanese	people.	Freedom	of	speech,	of	religion,	and	of	thought,	as	well	as	respect	
for	the	fundamental	human	rights	shall	be	established.	(emphasis	my	own)
On	 August	 15,	 1945,	 the	 Showa	 Emperor	 announced	 that	 Japan	 would	 surrender	
unconditionally,	and	the	fighting	ended	in	the	Pacific	Theater;	the	reckoning	for	the	Axis	Powers	
began	 shortly	 afterward.	The	 first	 International	Military	Tribunal	was	held	 in	Nuremberg,	
Germany,	 to	prosecute,	punish,	and	 leave	a	historical	 record	of	 the	“crimes	against	peace,”	
“conventional”	war	crimes,	and	“crimes	against	humanity”	committed	by	the	Nazi	political,	military,	
and	economic	leaders	of	the	war	in	Europe.	The	first	and	most	well	known	of	the	Nuremberg	trials,	
for	23	major	German	war	criminals,	had	four	presiding	judges	(from	France,	the	Soviet	Union,	the	
United	Kingdom,	and	the	United	States).	It	began	on	November	20,	1945,	and	ended	a	little	more	
than	ten	months	 later	when	the	sentences	were	read	on	October	1,	1946.	Three	of	the	top	Nazi	
leaders―party	leader	Adolf	Hitler,	military	commander	Heinrich	Himmler,	and	propaganda	minister	
Joseph	Goebbels―were	never	tried	because	they	had	all	committed	suicide	 in	April	and	May	of	
1945.	
The	second	one,	the	International	Military	Tribunal	for	the	Far	East,	was	held	in	Tokyo	for	
the	same	reasons	to	prosecute	Class	A	(major)	 Japanese	war	criminals.	On	April	29,	1946,	 the	
Showa	Emperor’s	birthday,	indictments	were	issued	for	28	defendants,	a	list	that	did	not	include	the	
emperor	himself.	The	opening	statements	for	the	prosecution	were	made	on	May	3,	1946,	and	the	
defense	finally	rested	 its	case	almost	two	years	 later	on	April	18,	1948.	The	panel	of	11	 judges,	
including	nine	from	nations	that	had	signed	the	Instrument	of	Surrender―Australia,	Canada,	China,	
France,	 the	Netherlands,	New	Zealand,	 the	Soviet	Union,	the	United	Kingdom,	and	the	United	
States―plus	India	and	the	Philippines,	then	spent	another	seven	months	making	their	 judgments.	
During	the	trial,	two	defendants	died	and	one	was	declared	mentally	incompetent.	On	November	12,	
1948,	about	31	months	after	the	trial	began,	all	of	the	remaining	25	defendants	were	found	guilty,	
including	General	Tojo	Hideki,	the	prime	minister	at	the	time	of	the	attack	on	Pearl	Harbor,	who	
had	attempted,	but	 failed,	to	commit	suicide	at	his	home	on	September	8,	1945,	the	day	he	was	
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served	with	a	warrant	for	his	arrest.	
Between	1945	and	1951,	trials	for	roughly	5,700	minor	Japanese	war	criminals	in	Classes	B	
and	C	were	held	by	various	countries―Australia,	Britain,	China,	France,	the	Netherlands,	the	
Philippines,	 the	Soviet	Union,	and	the	United	States―in	their	own	occupied	territories	 in	Asia	
according	 to	 their	own	 laws.	Formally,	Class	B	war	criminals	were	 those	who	had	committed	
“conventional”	atrocities	or	“crimes	against	humanity,”	and	Class	C	war	criminals	were	those	who	
had	been	involved	in	planning,	ordering,	authorization,	or	failure	to	prevent	such	transgressions.	
Approximately	three-fourths	of	all	Class	B	and	Class	C	trials	dealt	with	cruelties	to	prisoners	of	war.	
In	Japan,	during	the	American	Occupation,	the	Class	B	and	Class	C	trials	were	held	in	Yokohama	
under	the	authority	of	General	Douglas	MacArthur,	the	Supreme	Commander	for	the	Allied	Powers	
(SCAP)	in	Japan.	
One	of	the	aims	of	the	International	Military	Tribunals	held	in	Germany	and	in	Japan	was	to	
establish	the	individual	responsibility	of	the	war	criminals	through	a	legal	process.	This	was	done	to	
psychologically	separate	them	from	the	majority	of	 the	population	 in	both	the	eyes	of	 the	 local	
people	and	the	eyes	of	the	rest	of	the	world,	and	to	allow	the	countries	to	move	forward	in	a	new	
direction.	It	was	more	easily	accomplished,	however,	for	Class	A―the	military	and	political	leaders	
who	had	led	those	countries	into	the	war―than	for	those	tried	for	Class	B	and	Class	C	war	crimes.	
Futamura	(2008)	has	this	to	say	about	Japan:
The	tribunal’s	 individual	criminal	punishment	was	not	applied	to	the	Emperor,	 the	
Supreme	Commander	of	the	war.	The	extent	to	which	the	Emperor	played	an	actual	
and	vital	role	in	planning	and	waging	the	wars	of	aggression	has	been	fiercely	debated.	
However,	 it	 is	undeniable	 that	 the	 Japanese	 fought	 the	war	 in	 the	name	of	 the	
Emperor,	and	all	orders	followed	by	soldiers	during	the	war	were	given	in	his	name.	
Many	of	 those	tried	under	Class	B	and	C	war	crimes	trials	were	soldiers	 from	the	
battlefield	who	had	followed	orders	from	an	immediate	superior,	which	were	taken	as	
orders	from	the	divine	Emperor.	(pp.	120-121)	
General	MacArthur	and	others	in	charge	of	running	the	Occupation	of	Japan,	in	consultation	
with	President	Harry	Truman,	decided	that	the	most	effective	policy	for	getting	the	country	back	on	
its	feet	would	be	to	retain	the	Showa	Emperor	in	his	position	rather	than	symbolically	executing	him	
for	the	war	crimes	of	all	Japanese.	For	the	Class	B	and	Class	C	war	criminals,	this	meant	that	“just	
following	orders	when	fighting	for	the	Emperor”	was	not	a	mitigating	circumstance	in	their	defense.	
It	also	meant,	as	Dower	(1999)	said	in	Embracing Defeat,	that	the	trials	in	Yokohama	were	“another	
example	of	how,	in	war	and	peace,	individuals	lower	in	the	hierarchy	of	authority	had	to	pay	for	the	
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misdeeds	of	men	with	real	power”	(p.	449).	
2. The trial of the escort guard of the draft of 1,619 POWs who boarded  
    the Oryoku Maru on December 13, 1944, in the Philippines bound for Japan
The	trial	began	on	March	10,	1947,	 in	the	Yokohama	Courthouse.	Present	were	five	U.S.	 judges,	
three	U.S.	prosecutors,	three	U.S.	defense	attorneys,	five	Japanese	lawyers,	three	 interpreters,	
and	one	reporter.	The	nine	defendants,	all	of	whom	had	served	in	or	were	employed	by	the	Imperial	
Japanese	Army,	were	being	held	at	that	time	in	Sugamo	Prison	 in	Tokyo	and	were	also	present.	
They	were:	
◦　	First	Lieutenant	Toshino	Junsaburo	(age	43;	guard	commander	 for	this	draft	of	prisoners	of	
war)
◦　Sergeant	Hattori	Sho	(age	38;	second	in	command;	guard)
◦　Lance	Corporal	Aihara	Kazutane	(age	38;	guard	)
◦　Superior	Private	Kobayashi	Risaku	(age	40;	guard)
◦　Private	Ueda	Jiro	(age	35;	guard)
◦　Private	Yoshida	Hisao	(age	37;	guard)
◦　Sergeant	Major	Tanoue	Suketoshi	(age	30;	medical	non-commissioned	officer)	
◦　Captain	Kajiyama	Shin	(age	46;	civilian;	ship	master	for	the	Brazil	Maru)
◦　	Wada	Shusuke	(age	41;	civilian	employee	of	the	Japanese	Imperial	Army;	the	official	interpreter	
for	Lieutenant	Toshino)
　	(Note:	rank	or	status	in	the	Imperial	Japanese	Army	at	the	time	the	events	took	place;	age	at	the	
time	of	the	trial)
On	the	second	day	of	the	trial,	each	of	the	nine	defendants	was	charged	with	violating	the	
Laws	and	Customs	of	War;	all	pleaded	“Not	guilty.”	The	number	of	specifications	for	this	charge	for	
each	one	of	the	defendants	varied	from	18	for	Toshino	to	one	each	for	Tanoue,	Kobayashi,	Ueda,	
and	Yoshida;	to	all	the	specifications,	all	pleaded	“Not	guilty.”
The	main	issues	covered	in	the	trial	were	1)	how	the	plan	and	the	orders	for	the	transport	of	
these	1,619	POWs	from	the	Philippines	to	Japan	were	made,	2)	why	so	many	of	these	POWs	died	as	
a	result	of	being	transported,	3)	who	gave	the	orders	for	the	execution	of	15	of	these	POWs	at	San	
Fernando,	La	Union,	 on	or	 about	December	23,	 1944,	 and	4)	 the	 role	 of	Wada,	 the	official	
interpreter.	Only	 two	of	 the	 accused	 (Toshino	 and	Wada)	were	mentioned	by	name	 in	my	
grandfather’s	manuscript.	The	ship	master	(Kajiyama)	was	also	mentioned,	but	not	by	name,	and	it	
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is	not	clear	from	the	manuscript	whether	or	not	my	grandfather	had	any	direct	knowledge	of	any	of	
the	other	men,	though	one	assumes	that	he	must	have	seen	some	or	all	of	them.	My	grandfather	did	
not	mention	the	execution	of	the	15	prisoners	at	San	Fernando,	La	Union,	though	he	did	say	that	
some	of	the	weak	and	wounded	prisoners	were	taken	 into	the	school	building	after	they	arrived	
there,	and	Wada	talked	to	him	about	sending	some	prisoners	of	war	back	to	Bilibid	Hospital	 for	
treatment.	
The	trial	 lasted	about	two	months.	After	testimony	from	the	nine	defendants	and	31	other	
witnesses,	 including	five	 former	POWs	who	were	part	of	 this	draft	of	1,619,	and	a	review	of	63	
documents	that	had	been	submitted	in	evidence,	including	one	from	my	grandfather,	the	trial	ended	
on	May	2,	1947.	The	 judges	deliberated	 for	one	week,	and	on	May	9,	1947,	 the	verdicts	and	
sentences	were	announced.	
3. The accusations
All	nine	men	were	charged	with	violating	“the	Laws	and	Customs	of	War,”	i.e.,	“conventional”	war	
crimes	as	defined	by	the	Third	Geneva	Convention	of	1929.	The	specifications	for	the	charges	were	
related	to	Articles	12-16	in	Part	II:	General	Protection	of	Prisoners	of	War	and	to	Articles	21-48	
(Quarters,	Food	and	Clothing	of	Prisoners	of	War)	 and	Articles	29-32	 (Hygiene	and	Medical	
Attention)	in	Part	III:	Captivity.
Toshino,	the	senior	ranking	military	officer	and	guard	commander	 for	this	draft	of	1,619	
prisoners	of	war,	had	the	longest	list	of	specifications.	Nos.	1-5	dealt	with	his	responsibility	for	the	
prisoners	of	war	during	the	time	they	spent	on	the	Oryoku	Maru,	and	Nos.	6-7	dealt	with	the	time	
they	spent	at	Olongapo	Naval	Base	after	the	sinking	of	that	ship.	Nos.	8-13	dealt	with	the	time	the	
prisoners	of	war	spent	at	San	Fernando,	Pampanga,	and	San	Fernando,	La	Union,	and	Nos.	14-18	
dealt	with	the	time	the	prisoners	spent	on	the	Enoura	Maru	and	the	Brazil	Maru.	Some	of	 the	
specifications	charged	Toshino	with	the	deaths	of	specific	men	who	were	named	in	specific	incidents,	
such	as	No.	9,	which	dealt	with	the	execution	of	the	15	POWs	in	the	cemetery	at	San	Fernando,	
Pampanga.	No.	5	dealt	with	the	mistreatment	of	the	group	as	a	whole	on	the	Oryoko	Maru	and	is	
representative	of	the	charges	against	Toshino:	
Specification	5.	That	between	13	December	1944	and	15	December	1944,	 inclusive,	
aboard	 the	 Japanese	Troop	Transport	“Oryoku	Maru”,	 the	 accused	 Junsaburo	
Toshino,	then	and	there	being	the	Prisoner	of	War	Guard	Commander,	did	willfully	
and	unlawfully	mistreat,	abuse	and	cause	 intense	mental	and	physical	 suffering,	
temporary	 insanity,	 impairment	 of	 health,	 injury	 and	death	 to	numerous	other	
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American	and	Allied	Prisoners	of	War,	by:	
a.　Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	quarters;
b.　 Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	food;
c.　Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	drinking	water;
d.　Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	ventilation;
e.　Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	sanitary	and	hygienic	facilities;
f.　 Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	medical	attention;
g.　	Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	reasonable	measures	for	protection	from	
the	hazards	of	war;	
h.　Shooting	them;
i. 　	Ordering	Military	personnel	under	his	command	to	mistreat,	abuse,	beat	and	
shoot	them	and	neglecting	to	restrain	military	personnel	under	his	command	
from	abusing,	beating	and	shooting	them;
j. 　	Neglecting	 and	 refusing	 to	 make	 reasonable	 provisions	 for	 the	 safe	
debarkation	of	the	said	Prisoners.	
(United	States	of	America	vs.	Junsaburo	Toshino,	p.	3)
There	were	16	specifications	 listed	against	Wada,	the	official	 interpreter	 for	this	draft	of	
prisoners	of	war	for	the	entire	 journey	from	the	Philippines	to	Japan.	As	in	Toshino’s	case,	some	
referred	to	his	role	in	the	deaths	of	specific	men	in	specific	situations	and	others	dealt	with	his	role	
in	the	mistreatment	of	the	group	as	a	whole.	Specification	No.	8	dealt	with	Wada’s	actions	on	the	
night	of	the	execution	of	the	15	POWs	at	the	cemetery	 in	San	Fernando,	Pampanga.	No.	2,	the	
example	below,	dealt	with	the	death	of	a	POW	who	had	been	shot	by	a	guard	on	the	Oryoku	Maru	
and	whose	gangrenous	arm	had	to	be	amputated	with	a	mess	kit	knife	and	no	anesthetic	while	the	
POWs	were	being	kept	on	the	tennis	court	at	Olongapo	Naval	Base	after	the	sinking	of	the	ship,	an	
incident	which	was	recorded	in	SCAP	File	No.	014.13	and	Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	
(pp.	120-121),	but	not	in	my	grandfather’s	manuscript.	The	charges	listed	here	are	representative	of	
those	against	Wada:	
Specification	2.	That	between	15	December	1944	and	22	December	1944,	 inclusive,	
aboard	the	Japanese	Troop	Transport	“Oryoku	Maru”,	the	accused,	Shusuke	Wada,	
then	and	there	being	the	assistant	of	and	the	official	interpreter	for	the	Prisoner	of	War	
Guard	Commander,	did	willfully	and	unlawfully	cause	the	death	of	Corporal	Eugene	
Specht,	an	American	Prisoner	of	War	by:	
a. 　	Neglecting	to	restrain	Japanese	military	personnel	subject	to	his	supervision	
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and	control	from	shooting	said	Corporal	Specht;
b.　	Refusing	on	his	own	responsibility	and	neglecting	and	refusing	to	transmit	to	
his	superiors,	requests	for	adequate	quarters,	food,	drinking	water,	clothing,	
sanitary	and	hygienic	facilities	and	medical	treatment.	
(United	States	of	America	vs.	Shusuke	Wada,	p.	2)
There	were	five	specifications	against	Aihara,	all	of	them	accusing	him	of	committing	acts	of	
violence	against	the	prisoners	of	war	on	the	Oryoku	Maru,	Enoura	Maru,	and	Brazil	Maru.	No.	4	
dealt	with	his	 actions	on	 the	night	of	 the	execution	of	 the	15	POWs	at	 the	cemetery	 in	San	
Fernando,	Pampanga.	No.	5	is	representative	of	the	charges	against	Aihara:	
Specification	5.	That	between	27	December	1944	and	30	January	1945,	aboard	the	
Japanese	Troop	Transport	“Enoura	Maru”	and	“Brazil	Maru”,	the	accused,	Kazutane	
Aihara,	did	willfully	and	unlawfully	mistreat	and	abuse	numerous	American	and	Allied	
Prisoners	of	War	by	beating	them.	
(United	States	of	America	vs.	Kazutane	Aihara,	p.	2)
There	were	 four	specifications	against	Hattori.	No.	3	dealt	with	 the	execution	of	 the	15	
POWs	at	the	cemetery	in	San	Fernando,	Pampanga;	the	others	dealt	with	his	actions	on	the	Oryoku	
Maru	and	the	Brazil	Maru.	No.	2	is	representative	of	the	charges	against	Hattori:		
Specification	2.	That	between	13	December	1944	and	15	December	1944,	 inclusive,	
aboard	the	Japanese	Troop	Transport	“Oryoku	Maru”,	the	accused,	Sho	Hattori,	did	
willfully	and	unlawfully	cause	serious	 injury	and	death	to	numerous	American	and	
Allied	Prisoners	of	War	by	shooting	them,	by	ordering	Japanese	military	personnel	
subject	to	his	supervision	and	control	to	shoot	them,	and	by	neglecting	and	refusing	to	
restrain	 Japanese	military	personnel	 subject	 to	his	 supervision	and	control	 from	
shooting	them.	
(United	States	of	America	vs.	Sho	Hattori,	p.	2)
There	were	two	specifications	against	Kajiyama,	the	ship	master	of	the	Brazil	Maru.	The	first	
one	contained	a	long	list	of	the	names	of	men	who	were	known	to	have	died	on	that	ship;	the	second	
one	is	representative	of	the	charges	against	Kajiyama:	
Specification	2.	That	between	27	December	1944	and	30	January	1945,	 inclusive,	
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aboard	the	Japanese	Troop	Transport	“Brazil	Maru”,	the	accused,	Shin	Kajiyama,	did	
willfully	and	unlawfully	mistreat	and	abuse	and	cause	 intense	mental	and	physical	
suffering,	 impairment	of	health	and	death	to	numerous	other	American	Prisoners	of	
War	by:
a.　 Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	quarters;
b.　 Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	food;
c.　 Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	drinking	water;
d.　 Neglecting	and	refusing	to	provide	adequate	sanitary	and	hygienic	facilities.
(United	States	of	America	vs.	Shin	Kajiyama,	p.	2)
There	was	one	specification	each	for	Tanoue,	Ueda,	Yoshida,	and	Kobayashi,	all	of	whom	
were	present	at	the	execution	of	the	15	POWs	at	the	cemetery	in	San	Fernando,	Pampanga.		
Specification	1.	That	on	or	about	23	December	1944,	at	or	near	San	Fernando,	
Pampanga,	Luzon,	Philippine	Islands,	the	accused,	Suketoshi	Tanoue	/	Jiro	Ueda	/	
Hisao	Yoshida	/	Risaku	Kobayashi,	did,	in	conjunction	with	other	persons,	willfully	and	
unlawfully	kill	Lieutenant	Dwight	D.	Edison,	Lieutenant	John	W.	Elliot,	Lieutenant	
Colonel	Samuel	W.	Freeny,	Pharmacist’s	Mate	Second	Class	Deenah	R.	McCurry,	
Lieutenant	Colonel	Ulysses	 J.	L.	Peoples,	 Jr.,	Second	Lieutenant	Herman	W.	
Sherman,	Major	Wendell	F.	Swanson,	and	eight	other	unidentified	American	Prisoners	
of	War	by	stabbing	and	decapitating	them.	
(United	States	of	America	vs.	Suketoshi	Tanoue,	p.	2)
(United	States	of	America	vs.	Jiro	Ueda,	p.	2)
(United	States	of	America	vs.	Hisao	Yoshida,	p.	2)
(United	States	of	America	vs.	Risaku	Kobayashi,	p.	2)
4. How was the plan for the transport of these 1,619 POWs from  
    the Philippines to Japan made, and how were the orders given? 
Information	about	the	origin	of	the	plan	to	transport	this	draft	of	1,619	prisoners	of	war	from	the	
Philippines	to	Japan	in	December	1944	was	found	in	the	testimony	of	Colonel	Odashima,	the	Vice	
Director	of	the	Prisoner	of	War	Information	Bureau	(PWIB)	in	Tokyo	under	General	Hamada,	chief	
of	the	PWIB,	during	the	war.	In	March	1944,	Odashima	was	ordered	to	visit	all	prisoner	of	war	
camps	in	Japan	and	in	Formosa,	Hong	Kong,	Siam,	Malaya,	Java,	and	the	Philippines.	He	arrived	in	
Manila	on	April	18,	1944,	and	conferred	with	General	Kou,	the	main	camp	commandant,	and	Major	
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General	Kawase,	the	other	POW	Chief.	General	Kou	advised	Odashima	that	all	POWs	should	be	
removed	 from	the	Philippines	as	quickly	as	possible	because	the	situation	was	becoming	tense.	
Odashima	sent	a	radiogram	to	General	Hamada	 in	Tokyo,	who	consulted	with	General	Tojo,	the	
prime	minister	of	Japan	at	that	time,	and	a	policy	was	formulated.	The	order	to	evacuate	non-officer	
POWs	from	the	Philippines	was	issued	in	Tokyo	in	July	1944,	and	the	order	to	evacuate	the	officer-
level	POWs	was	issued	in	September	1944.	Lieutenant	General	Ikeda	of	the	Kwangtung	Army	in	
Manchuria	and	Major	General	Ihara	of	the	Korean	Army	agreed,	in	September	1944,	to	accept	the	
officer-level	POWs.	
On	or	about	December	16,	1944,	General	Kou	sent	a	radiogram	to	Odashima	that	the	draft	of	
POWs	had	been	shipped	from	Manila	on	the	Oryoku	Maru,	and	he	kept	Tokyo	informed	each	step	of	
the	way	as	the	various	disasters	hit.	General	Kou	also	requested	supplies.	Odashima	testified	that	he	
was	there	in	Moji	when	the	Brazil	Maru	arrived	on	January	30,	1945.	He	boarded	the	ship	and	was	
shown	around	by	Toshino.	He	noted	the	poor	condition	of	the	surviving	POWs,	and	he	personally	
recommended	that	they	temporarily	be	sent	to	POW	camps	run	by	the	Western	Army	in	various	
parts	of	 the	 island	of	Kyushu	to	recover	before	being	sent	 to	work	at	camps	 in	Manchuria	and	
Korea.	
As	 for	 the	 logistics	of	 this	plan,	 it	was	possible	 to	establish	 the	chain	of	 command	 for	
organizing	the	transport	of	this	draft	of	1,619	prisoners	of	war	from	the	testimony	of	four	witnesses,	
Nukada,	Isoya,	Inada,	and	Toyama.	According	to	them,	it	was	follows:	The	order	to	send	a	draft	of	
about	1,600	prisoners	of	war	to	be	used	as	 labor	 in	Manchuria	and	Korea	originated	 in	Tokyo.	It	
went	down	from	General	Sugiyama,	the	War	Minister,	to	Major	General	Nukada,	the	Chief	of	the	
Third	Bureau	of	Transportation	and	Communication,	to	General	Saiki	of	the	Shipping	Command,	
and	finally	to	Isoya,	the	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Shipping	Command.	From	there	it	went	out	to	General	
Yamashita,	the	head	of	the	14th	Area	Army	in	the	Philippines,	and	then	to	Inada,	who	was	head	of	
the	Third	Shipping	Transport	Command	in	Manila.	Toyama,	who	was	in	the	Operation	and	Planning	
Section	of	the	Third	Shipping	Transport	Command,	made	the	actual	plan	to	use	the	Oryoku	Maru	to	
ship	this	draft	of	prisoners	of	war,	and	Inada	approved	Toyama’s	plan.	The	order	then	went	down	to	
Lieutenant	Colonel	Morishita,	the	Anchorage	Commander,	who	allocated	the	number	of	men	to	be	
kept	in	each	hold	of	the	Oryoku	Maru.	He	placed	a	requisition	for	food	and	water	to	the	Provisions	
Depot	of	the	14th	Area	Army	and	to	the	ship’s	captain,	who	was	to	send	a	report	to	the	Anchorage	
Headquarters	as	to	the	amount	of	supplies	already	on	the	ship.	
Only	after	all	of	the	above	preparations	had	been	made	was	the	order	then	given	to	Toshino,	
who	had	been	working	in	the	office	at	Cabanatuan	Prisoner	of	War	Camp	in	the	Philippines,	to	be	in	
charge	of	the	escort	guard	for	this	draft	of	prisoners.	The	following	testimony	by	Toshino	explains	
the	order	as	he	received	it:	
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Q: 	Now, Lieutenant, who gave you your orders appointing you guard escort commander 
for this trip from Manila to Moji?
A: 	From the Prisoner of W ar Transporting Commander who was the commanding officer 
of the prisoner of war camps, Lieutenant General Kou.
Q: 	What did those orders command you to do?
A: 	The order was to transport approximately 1,600 prisoners of war to Taiwan and to the 
home country. W e were supposed to transport thirty prisoners of war to the Taiwan 
Army, 580 to the home country, 450 to Korean Army, and 550 to the Manchurian 
Army. My order was to turn over these POWs when we reached Moji.
Q: 	W ere these orders oral or written?
A: 	I received a written order in the main camp on December 5.
.	.	.
Q: 	Could you have refused assignment as guard escort commander?
A: 	As to this order assignment I could not refuse it. 
Q: 	Now, were there any regulations available to you which set forth the duties of a guard 
escort commander?
A: 	There was no regulation as to the duties; however, at the Philippine Prisoner of W ar 
Main Camp there was a report and diary of the previous transport commander. I read 
this report and diary and followed it.
Q: 	And was this the first time you had ever served as a guard escort commander?
A: Yes.	
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	pp.	682-683)
5. Why did so many of the POWs in this draft die as a result of being transported?
Among	the	miscellaneous	papers	found	with	the	transcript	of	the	war	crimes	trial	was	the	following	
short	letter	from	my	grandfather	to	the	Officer	in	Charge	in	the	Casualty	Section	at	the	Pentagon,	
dated	February	4,	1948:	
Sir:	
I	have	very	carefully	studied	the	mimeographed	list	of	American	prisoners	of	
war	reported	killed	in	the	bombing	and	sinking	of	Japanese	prison	ship	“Oryoku	Maru”	
on	December	15,	1944.	
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I	am	definitely	able	to	state	the	dates	of	death	 in	the	following	tabulated	 list.	
The	causes	of	death	are	rather	difficult	 to	state,	as	 there	are	many	contributing	
factors.	However,	in	those	cases	not	listed	as	“killed	by	bombing”	the	primary	causes	
of	death	were	starvation,	dehydration,	dysentery,	and	exposure.	
Very	truly	yours,	
Carey	M.	Smith
Rear	Admiral	(MC)	USN,	ret.
The	1,619	men	in	this	draft	of	prisoners	of	war	left	Manila	on	December	13,	1944,	425	(26%)	
were	alive	when	they	reached	Moji,	Japan,	on	January	30,	1945,	and	only	285	(18%)	were	left	six	
weeks	after	 their	arrival.	The	reasons	more	than	1,300	of	 these	men	died	as	a	result	of	being	
transported	to	Japan	are,	as	my	grandfather	wrote,	“rather	difficult	to	state,	as	there	were	many	
contributing	factors.”	Certainly,	injuries	sustained	in	the	“friendly	fire”	attacks	by	American	planes	
and	submarines,	a	lack	of	equipment	and	supplies	to	treat	those	injuries,	and	other	health	problems,	
such	as	dysentery,	were	factors.	According	to	the	information	in	the	previous	section	on	planning,	a	
ship―the	Oryoku	Maru―had	been	found	to	transport	the	draft	of	1,619	POWs	from	the	Philippines	
to	 Japan,	and	 food	and	other	supplies	had	been	requisitioned	by	 the	people	who	organized	the	
journey.	The	testimony	in	the	trial,	however,	revealed	that	the	supplies	of	food	and	water	that	were	
actually	obtained	for	them	were	very	inadequate,	or	nonexistent,	and	this	 lack	of	supplies	greatly	
contributed	to	the	number	of	deaths.			
The	Oryoku	Maru	lacked	something	in	its	accommodations	and	amenities	for	the	prisoners	of	
war,	and	according	to	Toshino’s	testimony,	from	the	beginning,	it	also	lacked	adequate	supplies:	
Q: 	Now, if you will look at sub-paragraph b of Specification 5. Will you tell us what, if 
anything, you did relative to food aboard the Oryoku Maru? 
A: 	As for food, the time when I boarded the ship I made an immediate connection with the 
purser, as to the prisoner of war’s quantity of food, amount of serving, and water. 
Furthermore, I gave him my opinion. 
Q: 	What amount of food did you order for the prisoners of war per person?
A: 	In answering that question I would have to explain. 
Q: 	Before you explain, will you tell the Commission whether or not they got the amount of 
food that you ordered? Answer yes or no to that.
A: No.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	686)
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Toshino	goes	on	to	explain	that	the	attitude	of	the	purser	on	the	Oryoku	Maru	toward	him	
was	very	cold,	and	his	requests	for	more	food	and	water	for	the	prisoners	of	war	were	denied.	He	
then	consulted	with	the	liaison	officer	on	the	ship	about	the	food	situation,	but	shortly	afterwards,	
the	bombing	of	the	Oryoku	Maru	in	Subic	Bay	began	and	whatever	supplies	there	were	went	down	
with	the	ship.	The	surviving	POWs	made	their	way	to	the	shore	and	were	herded	onto	the	tennis	
court	by	the	guards,	and	Toshino	dispatched	Private	Kenjo	from	Olongapo	to	Manila	to	report	the	
situation	to	General	Kou,	the	main	camp	commandant:	
Q: What were your instructions to Kenjo?
A: 	I ordered Kenjo to go to Manila and meet the main camp commandant and to report 
the following: the bombing incident on December 14th and December 15th, the casualties 
we received and also the bombing we received while disembarking, and to report that 
the prisoners of war were temporarily housed in the tennis court, and also the food was 
not available in Olongapo. I ordered him to send food, clothing, medical supplies, and 
a medical officer and to send an additional guard right away to Olongapo. 
Q: 	Now until relief came from Manila was there any food available for the prisoners of 
war on the tennis court?
A: No. 
Q: Had you made any effort to obtain food for them from the Navy?
A: Yes. 
Q: And had they refused?
A: 	At first we were refused, but I contacted the Army guard unit and had them consult 
with the Navy and under agreement that the Army will return the amount that was 
furnished to the prisoners of war we obtained four bags of rice, sixty kilos per day, and 
two bags of salt. 
Q: W as it possible to have the rice cooked?
A: No. 
Q: Why?
A: 	I requested to the Navy to cook our food but their kitchen was bombed. This, I 
personally saw. The Navy was eating their food uncooked also. Then I went to the 
Army unit to have them cook our food but they were evacuating about ten kilos into the 
mountains and each soldier was cooking his food in his mess kit. . . . 
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	pp.	696-697)
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Tanoue	and	another	non-commissioned	officer	arrived	 from	the	main	camp	and	handed	
Toshino	an	order	 from	General	Kou	 to	 transport	 the	prisoners	of	war	 from	Olongapo	 to	San	
Fernando,	Pampanga,	which	he	did:	
Q: 	As regards the food, what would you say the condition was as regards the feeding of the 
prisoners of war at Pampanga?
A: 	At Pampanga we furnished the food that was brought from the Main camp and 
Lieutenant Kimura ordered Sergeant Shoji to buy all the food he could from the 
vicinity, so I cannot say that the food was abundant. However, I think it was enough to 
get along.
Q: W as it cooked or uncooked?
A: It was cooked food.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	700)
Lieutenant	Urabe	arrived	in	San	Fernando,	Pampanga,	from	Manila	and	handed	Toshino	an	
order	from	General	Kou,	the	main	camp	commandant,	to	transport	the	prisoners	of	war	by	train	
from	San	Fernando,	Pampanga,	to	San	Fernando,	La	Union,	and	from	there,	to	escort	them	on	an	
available	ship	to	Japan,	as	originally	planned:
Q: 	W ere they given food while they were being carried by rail from San Fernando, 
Pampanga, to San Fernando, La Union?
A: No. 
Q: Why?
A: 	According to the schedule we were supposed to depart from San Fernando, Pampanga, 
at 10:00 AM and they all had their lunch. If the train reached San Fernando, La 
Union, as scheduled we would reach around 7:00 or 8:00 PM that evening and the 
food would be available to them after they reached their destination. But the schedule 
was interfered with by the air raids and when we departed San Fernando, Pampanga 
it was 1:00 PM and between San Fernando, Pampanga, and San Fernando, La 
Union, there was no station in between where they would permit us to eat so we could 
not obtain any food and the time we reached San Fernando, La Union, was on 
December 25th around 2 AM.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	707)
During	the	few	days	they	stayed	at	San	Fernando,	La	Union,	the	prisoners	of	war	were	kept	
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at	a	schoolhouse	and	on	a	beach:	
Q: Now, what about food and water at the schoolhouse?
A: 	As for food, a cooked rice ball and some sort of sustenance food, which I have 
forgotten, was supplied by the Army unit. As for water, about eighty meters from the 
schoolhouse there was a well there and they were able to obtain abundant water from 
that well.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	708)
At	first,	under	written	orders	from	Anchorage	Headquarters,	all	the	prisoners	of	war	were	to	
be	transported	to	Japan	aboard	the	Brazil	Maru.	That	order	was	then	changed	to	the	Enoura	Maru,	
most	 likely	due	to	the	objections	of	Kajiyama,	the	ship	master	of	 the	Brazil	Maru.	About	three	
hundred	of	the	POWs	were	loaded	on	the	Brazil	Maru	anyway,	for	reasons	that	were	never	clarified	
in	 the	trial.	No	members	of	 the	escort	guard	were	put	on	board	the	Brazil	Maru,	and	Toshino	
testified	that	he	did	not	know	about	the	quarters,	 food,	water,	clothing,	and	sanitary	facilities	on	
that	ship.	About	food	on	the	Enoura	Maru,	he	said,	“On	board	the	Enoura	Maru	the	ship	master	and	
the	rest	of	the	crew	were	very	good	to	the	prisoners	of	war	compared	to	other	ships.	They	tried	to	
give	them	as	much	water	and	food	as	possible.	The	prisoners	that	I	contacted	were	very	pleased”	
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	711).
When	the	ships	arrived	 in	Takao,	Formosa,	Toshino	 testified	 that	he	made	a	request	 to	
Anchorage	Headquarters	to	disembark	the	prisoners	of	war	on	January	1,	1945,	but	this	was	denied.	
On	January	6,	he	received	an	order	to	transfer	the	prisoners	from	the	Brazil	Maru	to	the	Enoura	
Maru,	then,	on	January	9,	there	was	the	attack	of	“friendly	fire”	on	the	Enoura	Maru.	On	January	
10,	Toshino	went	to	Takao	Anchorage	Headquarters	to	make	a	report,	request	first	aid,	and	request	
that	the	bodies	of	the	approximately	400	POWs	who	had	died	be	removed.	On	January	11,	the	dead	
bodies	were	unloaded,	and	they	were	buried	nearby	on	Chijin	 Island	on	January	12	and	13.	All	
surviving	POWs	were	transferred	to	the	Brazil	Maru	on	January	13.	Toshino	testified	that	he	put	in	
requests	 for	clothing	and	medical	supplies	at	 the	Takao	Anchorage	Headquarters,	 the	Fortress	
Command,	the	Supply	Depot,	the	Taiwan	Army	Headquarters,	and	the	Taiwan	Prisoner	of	War	
Camp,	but	was	not	able	to	get	even	one	item.	
The	 following	 testimony	 related	 to	 food	 refers	 to	unauthorized	dealings	between	 the	
prisoners	of	war	and	the	crew	of	the	Brazil	Maru	during	the	voyage	from	Takao	to	Moji:
Q: 	Did you ever on that phase of the voyage tell the captain or his crew to keep away from 
the POWs on pain of being shot if they didn’t?
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A: I did not state they will be shot. 
Q: Did you threaten them in any way?
A: I would have to explain the answer to that question. 
Q: Go ahead. 
A: 	After the embarkation of the Brazil Maru, I don’t recall whether it was the 17th or the 
18th, but the ship crew of the Brazil (Maru) were sleeping next to the hold in which the 
prisoners of war were in, and I received a report that the ship crew were exchanging 
food, cigarettes with prisoner of war personal items such as rings and watches. I 
personally saw this myself. And in order to put a stop to this act I called the liaison 
officer and the ship crew into the saloon and asked that the quarters of these ship crew 
be changed. At the same time I asked that the persons who were not authorized in the 
hold not be permitted to go in. This request was made through the liaison officer to the 
ship. And at that time, I also stated if the persons were caught in exchanging with 
prisoners of war again they would be court-martialed.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	740)
In	the	testimony	of	Kajiyama,	the	ship	master	of	the	Brazil	Maru,	he	mentioned	the	following	
suggestion	that	he	made	to	Toshino	on	the	voyage	from	Takao	and	Moji:
Q: 	When you were near Shanghai did you communicate with the convoy commander with 
reference to leaving the convoy and going into Shanghai?
A: Are you referring did I communicate with the convoy commander?
Q: Yes. 
A: Yes. 
Q: What was the subject of the communication?
A: 	I informed him that the conditions of the POWs on board my ship was very bad and if 
they were to continue this voyage up to Moji there is fear that all prisoners would die 
and I asked him to permit me to enter the Shanghai harbor, and further informed him 
if there was permission from the troop commander I would go into the port of 
Shanghai. 
Q: What reply did Toshino give to your suggestion?
A: 	His reply was that there was no sense in going into Shanghai because there was no 
place to quarter the prisoners of war there and he also stated that the death rate of the 
prisoners was gradually going down and the prisoners of war also wanted to reach 
Japan as soon as possible because they could recuperate. He further stated he was 
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following the International law in handling the prisoners of war, so there is nothing to 
worry about, and he asked me to perform my duty as ship master and put in every effort 
so that we could reach the destination as soon as possible. 
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	869)
It	was	all	too	much	for	Kajiyama.	At	San	Fernando,	La	Union,	he	had	vigorously	protested	
taking	the	POWs	aboard	the	Brail	Maru	because	of	inadequate	supplies	of	food	and	water	and	having	
a	dirty	and	damaged	ship.	He	was	told,	“All	you	have	to	do	 is	carry	out	the	order	and	make	this	
voyage”;	in	other	words,	he	was	threatened	with	court-martial	 if	he	didn’t	comply.	At	Takao,	he	
couldn’t	get	supplies,	Toshino	refused	to	stop	 in	Shanghai	to	try	to	get	some	there,	and	the	trip	
from	Takao	to	Moji	took	much	longer	than	usual,	all	of	which	exacerbated	the	misery	of	the	POWs	
and	 increased	 the	number	of	deaths.	At	Moji,	he	made	a	report	on	 the	voyage	 to	 the	military	
authorities	and	requested	his	immediate	dismissal	as	ship	master	of	the	Brazil	Maru.	He	also	told	the	
officer	 in	charge	of	unloading	the	sugar	at	Moji	harbor	that	he	knew	the	prisoners	of	war	were	
stealing	some,	but	he	did	nothing	to	stop	them,	and	if	the	Army	wanted	to	punish	anyone	for	this	
matter,	he	would	take	the	responsibility.	
In	Toshino’s	final	statement	before	the	court,	he	said:	
A: 	Transporting of the prisoners of war at that time was a difficult task. V arious requests 
that I received concerning to water, food and clothing, the requests which were made by 
senior prisoner of war officer Colonel Beecher, Pyzick, Englehart, and various other 
prisoners of war which were made to me directly or through Interpreter W ada were not 
fully satisfied. Even though myself, W ada, Hattori and my other subordinates put in 
their utmost efforts. While in the harbor, after receiving these requests, we made 
various requests to Japanese units but were always rejected, stating that “Did we know 
or realize the conditions of the war?” I sincerely regret that the requests which were 
sent in by the prisoners of war were not fulfilled. . . .”
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	763)
6. Who gave the orders for the execution of 15 POWs at San Fernando, La  
    Union, on or about December 23, 1944?
SCAP	File	No.	014.13,	Summary	No.	510,	describes	the	execution	of	these	15	POWs	as	follows:	
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About	1800	P.M.	on	 the	23rd	 of	December1	Wada	came	 to	 the	 two	group	
commanders	and	wanted	the	15	sickest	men	to	be	selected	for	return	to	Manila	 for	
hospitalization.	Among	 the	group	 selected	were	Lieutenant	Dwight	D.	Edison,	
Lieutenant	John	W.	Elliot,	Lieutenant	Colonel	Samuel	W.	Freeny,	Pharmacists	Mate	
2/c	Deenah	R.	McCurry,	Lieutenant	Colonel	Ulysses	 J.	L.	Peoples,	 Jr.,	Second	
Lieutenant	 Herman	 V.	 Sherman,	 Major	 Wendell	 F.	 Swanson	 and	 eight	 other	
unidentified	American	Prisoners	of	War.	
About	1900	a	truck	was	brought	to	where	the	group	was	waiting	and	the	sick	
men	were	driven	in	the	truck	to	a	small	cemetery	on	the	outskirts	of	San	Fernando,	
Pampanga.	When	they	arrived	at	the	cemetery	there	were	a	group	of	soldiers	who	had	
dug	a	hole	about	15	feet	square.	When	the	guards	on	the	truck	had	dismounted	they	
took	up	positions	about	the	hole.	Two	of	the	guards	brought	one	of	the	prisoners	to	
the	hole.	He	was	told	to	kneel	at	the	edge	of	the	hole	and	take	a	position	as	though	in	
prayer.	The	prisoner	was	then	decapitated,	and	allowed	to	fall	into	the	hole.	Another	
prisoner	was	brought	 to	 the	hole	 and	he	was	bayoneted	 and	decapitated.	This	
procedure	was	followed	until	all	fifteen	of	the	prisoners	had	either	been	decapitated	or	
bayoneted.	It	 is	alleged	that	at	this	execution	both	Wada	and	Toshino	were	present,	
that	they	supervised	and	took	part	in	it.	(pp.	6-7)
Clearly,	the	execution	of	these	15	men	was	a	violation	of	Article	13	of	the	Third	Geneva	
Convention:	“Prisoners	of	war	must	 at	 all	 times	be	 treated	humanely.	Any unlawful act or 
omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a 
prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited,	and	will	be	regarded	as	a	serious	breach	of	the	present	
Convention.	.	.	.”	(emphasis	my	own)
The	order	to	execute	the	fifteen	POWs	originated	in	Manila	in	the	office	of	General	Kou,	the	
main	camp	commandant.	Lieutenant	Urabe,	who	worked	under	General	Kou	in	that	office,	was	given	
the	assignment	of	relaying	the	order	to	Lieutenant	Toshino	in	San	Fernando,	Pampanga,	and	seeing	
that	it	was	carried	out.	The	following	excerpt	is	from	Toshino’s	testimony:	
Q: 	Lieutenant, will you look now at Specification 9; at Pampanga was any selection made 
of certain of the prisoners of war who were critically ill to be placed aboard a truck?
A: Yes.	
1	 For	the	record,	Toshino	testified	at	the	trial	that	this	execution	took	place	on	the	night	of	December	22,	
1944.	
66
Q: What was the purpose of their being placed aboard that truck?
A: 	The reason that the ill prisoners of war that were placed on the truck was to be 
decapitated under the order of the main camp commandant. 
Q: Who did you talk with relative to this decapitation?
A: The order was passed down to me from Lieutenant Urabe. 
Q: Tell the Commission that conversation. 
A: 	. . . Lieutenant Urabe passed the order which was from the main camp commandant 
that the sick and injured prisoners of war were to be executed here at San Fernando. . 
. . I asked him to send these prisoners back to the Manila Hospital. There Lieutenant 
Urabe told me that when he left Manila he was informed by Lieutenant General Kou 
that the sick and injured prisoners of war would interfere with transportation, and 
also stated that “if they were to be taken back to Manila, on the way back through the 
long hours of the voyage on a truck they will suffer and it will be more pitiful, and 
furthermore if the injured prisoners of war were taken back to Manila the incident of 
Olongapo would be known in Manila. It is a pitiful thing. However, tell Lieutenant 
Toshino to carry out the execution at that place with the mercy of a knight.” . . . 
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	pp.	701-702)	
	
All	of	the	accused	at	this	trial,	with	the	exception	of	Kajiyama,	the	ship	master	of	the	Brazil	
Maru,	were	charged	with	taking	part	in	this	execution,	and	they	were	closely	questioned	about	the	
events	that	took	place	that	night.	This	account	was	given	by	Tanoue,	a	non-commissioned	officer	in	
the	medical	section	of	the	main	prisoner	of	war	camp	who	often	traveled	between	there	and	Bilibid;	
Captain	Nogi	was	Tanoue’s	immediate	superior.	According	to	Tanoue:	
Q: 	A few days prior to December the 23rd 1944 did you receive an order from Captain Nogi 
to go any place?
A: Yes. 
Q: What did Captain Nogi tell you?
A: 	He stated that he received a word that Lieutenant Toshino’s guarding the prisoners of 
war received a bombing from the American planes and they were at Olongapo without 
anything so he ordered me to take a medical supply which I was to receive from the 
Bilibid Hospital, and after turning over the medical supplies he told me I was under 
Lieutenant Toshino’s order and was to help transporting prisoners. 
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	551)	
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Tanoue	went	on	to	explain	that	he	picked	up	about	15	boxes	of	American	Red	Cross	medical	
supplies	 from	Bilibid	and	 left	Manila	with	 four	officers	and	20	or	30	soldiers	and	civilian	army	
employees	 (gunzoku)	 in	a	convoy	of	approximately	30	trucks.	Lieutenant	Urabe,	General	Kou’s	
assistant,	left	Manila	the	next	day.	At	Olongapo,	they	loaded	1,200	to	1,300	POWs	on	the	trucks	and	
traveled	to	San	Fernando,	Pampanga.	On	Urabe’s	orders,	the	POWs	were	placed	in	a	theater	and	
the	provincial	jail	there.	During	the	time	they	were	in	San	Fernando,	Pampanga,	four	of	the	POWs	
died:
Q: What did you do in reference to their burial?
A: 	With the help of the guard we took the dead body (sic) to the San Fernando cemetery 
and buried them one by one. 
Q: Did you do anything after that?
A: 	After burying the bodies I picked a wild flower around there and placed it on their 
grave, gave a prayer, and then left the cemetery. 
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	553)	
On	December	23,	1944,	Tanoue	received	an	order	to	report	to	Lieutenant	Urabe’s	office:
Q: What did you do?
A: I went to Lieutenant Urabe’s place.
Q: When you arrived at Lieutenant Urabe’s office who was present?
A: 	As far as I can recall, Lieutenant Urabe, Lieutenant Kimura, and Lieutenant 
Toshino, and Sergeant Nakanishi was there. 
Q: 	Now tell us in your own words just what was said in Lieutenant Urabe’s office after 
you got there, what did you do, and what did anyone else in the office do? Tell it in 
your own words.
A: Yes. 
Q: Go ahead. 
A: 	I went into Lieutenant Urabe’s quarters, stood in front of him and gave a salute. After 
this, Lieutenant Urabe told me to sit in the chair. I sat down and at this time it seems 
to me that Lieutenant Toshino left the room. He told me that the fifteen most serious 
prisoners of war that could not make the trip will be executed tonight and told me, 
“Sergeant Tanoue will used (sic) your sword and execute this fifteen prisoners of war.” 
After I heard that fifteen prisoners of war will be executed I was so stunned at that 
time I could not say (anything) for a while. For a few minutes I just sat there. Then I 
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told Lieutenant Urabe that I was a medical sergeant and up to the present moment I 
never cut anyone yet and I also told him that my duty as a medical of (sic) sergeant 
was not that there was an enemy or friend and my duty was to help anyone and I asked 
him to have someone else perform this duty and furthermore I asked Lieutenant Urabe 
to send these fifteen sick prisoners of war to Bilibid Hospital for treatment. . . .  The 
answer was that they could not be sent and he stated that if we send these sick 
prisoners of war to Manila the incident, the bombing incident, and the condition that 
occurred at Olongapo will be known to the prisoners of war in Manila, so therefore we 
could not send them.	
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	554)	
In	his	testimony	the	next	day,	Tanoue	continued	answering	questions	about	the	execution:
A: 	Then Lieutenant Urabe mentioned to me that the execution is tonight, and I was to 
receive the detailed orders from Lieutenant Toshino and further stated that this 
execution is top secret to other non-commissioned officers or the soldiers. Then 
Lieutenant Urabe stated that the severe patients will be brought out by Lieutenant 
Toshino, through Interpreter W ada, and Master Sergeant Tanoue will go in front of 
the theater when the patients are brought out. . . . For a few minutes I just sat there; 
then I asked Lieutenant Urabe two times whether this was an official order. . . . In the 
Japanese Army when you receive an official order you stand to attention and receive the 
order. The reason I asked Lieutenant Urabe twice whether this was an official order is 
because Lieutenant Urabe was sitting in a chair and I was sitting in a chair; therefore, 
I asked him twice if there (sic) was an official order.
Q: What did Urabe say?  
A: 	In a strong voice he told me it was an order; then I left Lieutenant Urabe’s room.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	556)
That	evening,	Tanoue	went	to	the	cemetery	in	the	truck	with	Lieutenant	Toshino,	Wada,	the	
guards,	and	the	15	prisoners	of	war.	On	arrival,	Lieutenant	Toshino	ordered	him	to	carry	out	the	
execution,	and	Tanoue	asked	to	have	someone	else	do	it.	Toshino’s	answer	was	“What’s	the	matter,	
you	are	an	active	service	senior	non-commissioned	officer,	so	carry	it	out.”	As	a	non-commissioned	
officer,	Tanoue	did	not	carry	a	rifle,	pistol,	or	revolver,	but	his	uniform	did	include	a	sword,	which	
he	then	used	to	decapitate	seven	or	eight	prisoners	of	war	near	the	hole	that	had	been	dug	there.	
He	was	in	such	a	state	of	mental	strain	by	that	time	that	he	went	back	to	where	Lieutenant	Toshino	
69
War	Stories	(5):	Judgment	at	Yokohama	(March	10	―	May	9,	1947)
was	standing	a	few	meters	away	and	asked	him	to	have	someone	else	continue	the	job.	This	request	
was	granted,	and	he	stayed	with	Toshino	until	all	15	of	the	prisoners	of	war	had	been	killed,	then	he	
went	back	to	help	fill	 in	the	hole,	now	the	grave	of	the	15	POWs,	with	dirt.	Lieutenant	Toshino,	
Wada,	Tanoue,	and	the	guards	 immediately	returned	to	San	Fernando,	Pampanga,	 in	the	truck.	
Tanoue’s	testimony	continues:	
Q: 	After you returned to San Fernando, Pampanga, did you make a report to Lieutenant 
Urabe in any way?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Where was Lieutenant Urabe at that time?
A: He was in his own quarters.
Q: What did you say to Lieutenant Urabe?
A: 	I reported that the fifteen sick prisoners of war were executed and stated to him I never 
had such an unpleasant job as this. 
Q: Did you say anything further to him?
A: No. 
Q: Where did you go from there? 
A: 	He thanked me for my trouble, then I left Lieutenant Urabe’s quarters and I am not 
sure but I think I washed my sword and went back to my quarters and to rest.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	563)		
Other	sections	of	Tanoue’s	testimony	dealt	with	his	training	in	the	Imperial	Japanese	Army:	
Q: 	Tanoue, were you taught as a member of the Japanese Army anything about an 
inferior obeying a superior officer’s order?
A: Yes. 
Q: 	Tell the Commission what you were taught in reference to the question I have asked. 
A: 	First of all, when we joined the Army, the first thing we learn is order(s) and anything 
that pertains to order(s); next, the Emperor’s Mandates; next, the interior Army 
Regulations, Army criminal law, then the power of court-martial. These are all the 
things that we learned. 
Q: 	What have you learned in reference to refusal to obey a superior’s order during war 
time, if anything?
A: 	Yes; if you refuse the superior officer’s order, you will be tried by army court-martial 
and the sentence will be the death penalty.
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(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	pp.	563-564)
After	returning	to	Manila,	Tanoue	told	the	court	that	he	made	a	report	about	the	execution	of	
the	15	POWs	at	San	Fernando,	Pampanga,	to	Captain	Nogi,	his	immediate	superior,	and	the	topic	of	
obeying	orders	came	up	again:
Q: 	Didn’t they teach you in the Japanese Army that a soldier did not have to obey an 
illegal order given by his superior officer?
A: No. 
Q: 	Lieutenant Urabe gave you an order not to talk when you got back to Manila, didn’t 
he?
A: Yes, he did say that to me when I was in San Fernando. 
Q: You disobeyed the order quick enough when you got back to Manila, didn’t you? 
A: 	It is not disobeying an order, because whatever we do we would have to report to the 
direct superior officer. And in the Japanese Army we would have to make a report and 
also a repetition of an order or message.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	pp.	589-590)
Toshino’s	testimony	also	contained	some	information	on	the	way	the	POWs	were	executed	
and	the	cultural	significance	of	executing	someone	by	decapitation:	
Q: 	Did Urabe give you orders in writing from General Kou that these POWs were to be 
executed?
A: No, it was verbal. 
Q: 	Did Urabe tell you that it was General Kou’s order that the prisoners of war should be 
bayoneted before they were beheaded?
A: I have heard from Lieutenant Urabe to decapitate or bayonet the prisoners of war. 
Q: 	Didn’t you say the other day that they were to be executed with what you called “the 
mercy of a knight”?
A: 	I have heard from Lieutenant Urabe that Lieutenant General Kou ordered it in such a 
manner. 
Q: And did that, in your opinion, include other methods of execution than beheading?
A: 	What I heard from Lieutenant Urabe is that the order was to decapitate or bayonet and 
not to let the prisoners of war suffer. 
Q: 	Now, isn’t it a fact in Japan it is considered an honorable way to die by being 
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beheaded?
A: 	As I recall, this decapitation is one way to relieve a person. In other words, when a 
person is suffering and is close to death they are decapitated to relieve them from 
suffering.
Q: 	It wasn’t the custom in Japan or in the Japanese Army to relieve a person from 
suffering by bayoneting him, was it?
A: 	In Japan, bayoneting is considered in connection with the knights. Also, in the Army 
it depends on the time and occasion when the bayonet would be used to execute.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	754)
One	part	of	Wada’s	testimony	about	his	own	actions	on	the	night	of	the	execution	of	the	15	
POWs	was	of	particular	interest:	
Q: 	. . . Now, I want you to tell this Commission, and you can go into detail on this, 
everything you did on this particular day and this particular night―the day and night 
of the execution. 
A: 	Lieutenant Urabe told me that the sick prisoners of war were to be sent to Manila 
Hospital so he told me to select these prisoners of war. . . . 
Q: After you were told by Lieutenant Urabe to perform a mission, what did you do?
A: 	I don’t recall exactly what time it was but it was still day time. I first went to this 
provincial jail and met Lieutenant Colonel Englehart and asked him how many 
wounded and sick prisoners of war were in that jail. When I inquired about these 
wounded and sick prisoners of war I was referring to the very serious patients who 
would have to receive medical treatment in Bilibid Hospital. There Lieutenant 
Englehart consulted with the prisoner of war medical officer and told me there were 
three very serious sick prisoners of war. I received the list of names of these seriously 
sick prisoners of war. Then I went to this theater which was about one mile from this 
jail. I don’t think I met Colonel Beecher at that time. However, the person I met was 
the senior prisoner of war officer who was at Bilibid. It may have been because of the 
shock he received at Olongapo but he didn’t seem to understand what I was trying to 
say. Therefore I called another medical officer. There I told this medical officer that 
twelve very serious sick prisoners of war were to be sent to Manila to the Bilibid 
Hospital for treatment and asked him to select them. At that time I don’t recall 
whether I told him to have a physically fit medical doctor attend with them. 
Q: 	W ell, did they select any sick prisoners of war from the theater and turn them over to 
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you?
A: Yes.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	787)
This	testimony	interested	me	because	of	some	handwritten	marks	on	this	page	of	the	transcript.	In	
the	right-hand	margin,	two	names,	Joses	and	Hayes,	were	written	next	to	the	sentence,	“However,	
the	person	I	met	was	the	senior	prisoner	of	war	officer	who	was	at	Bilibid.”	In	the	left-hand	margin,	
there	was	a	bracket	around	the	sentences,	“Therefore	I	called	another	medical	officer.	There	I	told	
this	medical	officer	that	twelve	very	serious	sick	prisoners	of	war	were	to	be	sent	to	Manila	to	the	
Bilibid	Hospital	for	treatment	and	asked	him	to	select	them”	with	the	word	“me”	written	beside	the	
bracket.	 If,	as	I	suspect,	 these	words	were	written	by	my	grandfather,	 it	means	that	he	had	an	
unwitting	hand	in	choosing	the	men	who	died	later	that	night.
7. What was the role of Wada, the official interpreter?
In	the	opening	statement	of	the	prosecution	on	March	11,	1947,	there	was	the	following	paragraph:	
The	Commission	will	also	note	that	the	specifications	against	Wada	are	almost	
parallel	with	those	against	Toshino.	This	was	done	because	the	Prosecution	intends	to	
prove	 that	although	Wada’s	official	position	was	 that	of	a	civilian	 interpreter,	his	
authority,	powers,	and	activities	were	 those	of	an	administrative	assistant	 to	 the	
Guard	Commander;	that	he	had	the	assimilated	rank	of	a	commissioned	officer,	wore	a	
military	uniform	with	insignia	of	rank	and	enjoyed	all	the	privileges	of	commissioned	
rank	so	 far	as	quarters,	mess	and	authority	and	respect	were	concerned;	 that	he	
actually	had	the	authority	to	and	did	 issue	orders	and	grant	or	deny	requests	of	the	
Prisoners	on	his	own	responsibility.	The	evidence	will	show	that	Toshino	remained	for	
the	most	part	quite	aloof	from	the	Prisoners,	leaving	the	dirty	work	to	the	able	hands	
of	Mr.	Wada.	(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	15)
It	is	clear	from	the	transcript	of	this	trial	that	the	POWs	had	more	dealings	with	Wada	than	
with	any	other	member	of	 the	escort	guard.	He	supervised	 the	work	of	 the	other	guards	and	
received	and	replied	to	the	prisoners’	requests.	In	the	charges	against	Wada,	Specifications	1-7	and	
9-15	contained	the	phrase	“by	refusing	on	his	own	responsibility	and	neglecting	and	refusing	to	
transmit	to	his	superiors	requests	for	.	.	.	.”	During	the	trial,	an	effort	was	made	to	determine	how	
much	authority	he	actually	had.	Perhaps	the	most	useful	 information	about	 this	came	from	the	
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testimonies	of	Toshino	and	the	guard	Aihara.	According	to	Toshino:	
Q: 	Lieutenant Toshino, during the course of this trial there have been constant references 
to W ada directing the loading of the prisoners aboard the Oryoku Maru and directing 
the transfer of the prisoners at Takao and directing the prisoners off the boat at Moji. 
Now, were these things done under your orders or by W ada on his own initiative?
A: 	Interpreter W ada had no authority to order anyone. I passed him the orders 
and he merely carried out as to the directing. However, he could not even direct the 
guards or the soldiers. The only persons he could direct are the prisoners of war. The 
orders and directions pertaining to the prisoners of war would have to be explained. 
Q: Where did these orders and directions come from?
A: 	As for this order, I passed all the orders. And there was a time when I directly 
contacted Colonel Beecher through Interpreter W ada and passed the order down. There 
were other occasions when W ada would carry my order and pass it to Colonel Beecher 
himself and in turn Colonel Beecher would pass the order down to the prisoner of war 
senior officers.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	719;	emphasis	my	own)
In	SCAP	File	No.	014.13,	Aihara	was	described	as	“the	most	hated	guard	at	Cabanatuan.	The	
prisoners	nicknamed	him	‘Air	Raid,’	and	he	was	said	to	have	been	very	vicious.”	While	he	was	on	
the	stand,	he	was	cross-examined	about	 inconsistencies	 in	his	written	and	oral	statements.	This	
section	of	his	testimony	included	some	information	about	Wada	and	Toshino:	
Q: 	You were then asked, “W e know all through the trip, right up to Moji, W ada took 
responsibility on himself and gave orders to the soldiers; that is true, isn’t it?” To 
which you replied, “W e treated W ada as an officer . . . . He gave us orders and we 
listened to him as an officer.” Is that correct?  
A: 	No, I did not mention anything that we received direct orders from W ada for what I 
meant was that the order that was given down from Toshino was carried out by W ada. 
. . . W e treated W ada and respected him because he was older than the rest of us. 
Another thing I would like to mention is that W ada was the one that directly contacted 
the prisoners of war. This, he had to do because Lieutenant Toshino did not contact 
with the prisoners of war. This is the reason why the prisoners of war misunderstood 
that they thought W ada was giving the orders.
. . .
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Q: 	You were asked, at the same time and place, “As a matter of fact, throughout the 
entire voyage W ada gave you more orders than Toshino did, didn’t he?” To which you 
replied, “Yes, instead of receiving orders from Lieutenant Toshino we would rather 
have them from W ada because we didn’t like Toshino. He used to stay up on the 
bridge so I didn’t see him so much, so whenever W ada gave an order we would think it 
was directly from Toshino.” Is that right?
A: Yes.	
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	pp.	664-665)
In	his	manuscript,	my	grandfather	never	offered	a	direct	opinion	of	Wada’s	English	ability	or	
of	his	character.	He	did,	however,	refer	to	Wada	by	name	three	times,	and	two	of	those	times	he	
used	a	certain	phrase,	“a	Mr.	Watta	(sic).”	I	can	hear	his	voice	saying	“a	Mr.	Watta”	with	a	certain	
inflection,	and	the	nuance	is	that	he	did	not	admire	him.	During	the	trial,	three	of	the	former	POWs	
who	testified	were	specifically	asked	questions	about	Wada’s	language	ability,	and	they	all	said	that	
his	English	was	difficult	to	understand	and	sometimes	he	spoke	quite	rudely	to	them.	Mr.	Threatt,	a	
civilian	prisoner	of	war	who	had	been	captured	at	the	fall	of	Bataan,	testified	as	follows:
Q: 	And W ada would talk to the group commanders in the English language, wouldn’t 
he?
A: 	He would talk to the group commanders in English―usually it took another 
interpreter to interpret what he said, though. 
Q: Are you trying to tell this Commission that W ada’s English is not understandable?
A: That that he used with us was atrocious. 
Q: 	And you testified that Colonel Beecher had many conversations with W ada; you have 
testified that others had many conversations with W ada. Do you mean to say now that 
they had difficulty in understanding his English?
A: 	Colonel Beecher and the other commanders always had one of the POW interpreters 
near; they possibly could understand what Mr. W ada said, I don’t know. I only speak 
for the conversations I heard. 
Q: 	Mr. Threatt, do you mean to say that when W ada was talking with Colonel Beecher 
that either Mr. Bolney or Mr. Lynch was always present?
A: 	Mr. Bolney and Mr. Lynch ― I would not say that Mr. Bolney or Mr. Lynch were 
always present but either Bolney, Lynch, Major Pyzick or Colonel Englehart or one of 
the other interpreters was usually with him. 
Q: 	In what language during these times would W ada speak?
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A: 	He spoke in English but if something came up which he couldn’t put over in English he 
would turn to the American interpreter and tell him in Japanese. 
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	244)
Captain	Mittenthal,	who	was	captured	on	Bataan	and	endured	the	Death	March,	said	the	
following	about	Wada	on	the	Oryoku	Maru	after	the	bombing:
Q: Did the men at that time shout up to him for aid?
A: 	The only thing I heard the men holler up was asking for food and water and water (sic) 
and what he would say was “Shut up – I don’t care if you all die.” 
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	254)
Schwartz,	the	doctor	from	the	U.S.	Army	Medical	Corps	who	amputated	Specht’s	arm	on	the	
tennis	court	at	Olongapo,	reported	the	following	about	Wada	after	evacuating	the	Oryoku	Maru:	
Q: What were W ada’s activities at that time?
A: 	W ada appeared at the tennis court several times daily; at each of his appearances, 
requests were made to him with no results. The morning after the first night on the 
tennis court, Colonel Beecher and I interviewed Mr. W ada at his first appearance at 
the tennis court. W e talked to him through the wire netting near the entrance to the 
tennis court. Colonel Beecher described our crowded conditions on the tennis court, 
which were very evident, he described the terrific cold we had endured the previous 
night, laying on the concrete of the tennis court, requested food since we had had 
nothing to eat for over 36 hours, and requested clothes. I, in turn, requested that the 
sick and wounded be evacuated to a hospital, or failing in that, we be issued medical 
supplies which at that time had been completely exhausted. Mr. W ada said that many 
medical supplies had been on board the ship but had been sunk with the ship; he said 
that we had to wait where we were until they received instructions from Manila and 
then tore into a tirade about our lot being the result of our own American bombers. 
This statement I heard innumerable times from him. His attitude and demeanor was 
very unsympathetic and hostile.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	358)
Compare	this	to	the	testimony	of	Colonel	Montgomery,	who	had	known	Wada	at	Davao	Penal	
Colony	in	somewhat	calmer	circumstances.	He	testified	that	Wada	was	on	good	terms	there	with	a	
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Colonel	Olson:	
Q: 	Can you tell this Commission whether or not Colonel Olson and W ada were very good 
friends?
A: 	That requires some additional explanation. . . . Colonel Olson and W ada got along 
very well; W ada on occasions gave Colonel Olson some presents in the form of food, 
cigarettes and occasionally candy. Now, I don’t say that classifies Olson as a good 
friend of W ada but W ada showed kindness to Olson on occasions. Now, I was Colonel 
Olson’s adjutant and from time to time we discussed the matter of Olson and W ada 
and he thought it was expedient for the benefit of the camp for him to keep on good 
terms with W ada. . . .
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	173)	
In	SCAP	File	No.	014.13,	Wada	was	described	as	“merciless	 in	his	dealings	with	 the	
prisoners,	they	received	absolutely	no	consideration	at	all.”	Yet,	towards	the	end	of	the	trial,	the	
Defense	was	able	to	call	one	witness	who	introduced	as	evidence	three	letters	in	support	of	Wada.	
The	witness	was	Dr.	Bunce,	an	American	who	had	known	Wada	in	his	hometown	of	Matsuyama	on	
the	island	of	Shikoku	for	about	three	years	from	1936	to	1939.	He	said:
Q: 	Do you know Mr. W ada’s general reputation insofar as honesty, integrity and peaceful 
character are concerned?
A: Yes, I think I do.
Q: Will you please state that to the Commission?
A: 	In Matsuyama and Shikoku W ada had an excellent reputation. He was well known to 
the foreign community in Matsuyama and was commonly referred to as the 
“Foreigners’ Friend”.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	840)
Dr.	Bunce	also	read	out	 the	 three	 letters	 in	court.	The	 first	 two	were	 from	Lieutenant	
Colonel	Lentz,	who	was	 in	the	U.S.	Army	Medical	Corps	and	who	knew	Wada	when	he	was	an	
interpreter	at	Bilibid	prisoner	of	war	camp	in	1942	and	later	at	Zentsuji	Camp	in	Shikoku,	where	
Colonel	Lentz	was	later	held,	in	April	or	May	of	1945.	In	his	official	letter	for	the	court,	Lieutenant	
Colonel	Lentz	described	his	dealings	with	Wada	and	said	that	he	had	“a	high	regard	for	him	as	a	
gentleman.”	In	his	personal	letter	to	Dr.	Bunce,	he	wrote:
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.	.	.	I	feel	very	much	as	you	do	regarding	Mr.	Wada,	as	he	was	always	kind	to	
me.	As	 far	 as	 I	 know,	 everything	 he	 is	 charged	 with	 concerns	 his	 position	 as	
interpreter	on	that	 ill-fated	December	ship	1944,	 from	Manila	to	Japan,	which	was	
bombed	and	sunk	 twice,	plus	overcrowding,	 inadequate	ventilation,	 food,	water,	
medical	supplies,	medical	care,	and	disposal	of	the	dead.	.	.	.	I	personally	feel	that	he	
was	caught,	as	one	of	the	misfortunes	of	war,	 in	a	“hell	of	a	situation”	between	one	
Toshino	and	a	 large	shipment	of	POWs.	I	project	myself	 to	ask,	“What	would	I	do	
under	the	circumstances?”	.	.	.	Give	Mr.	Wada	my	best	regards	and	best	wishes.	I	am	
also	 enclosing	 a	 dollar	 bill,	 hoping	you	 can	 send	him	a	 carton	of	 cigarettes	 or	
something.	(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission,	p.	842)
The	 third	 letter	was	 from	Dr.	and	Mrs.	Gulick	of	Chicago,	 Illinois,	who	had	known	Wada	 in	
Matsuyama	when	they	 lived	there	from	1926	to	1937,	while	Dr.	Gulick	was	the	principal	of	 the	
Matsuyama	Night	School.	It	said:	
.	 .	 .	All	of	his	actions	and	words	were	clearly	 indicative	of	genuine	and	straight-
forward	helpfulness,	so	that	he	was	welcome	in	other	American	and	English	homes	
besides	our	own.	In	fact,	Mr.	Wada	put	himself	out	to	give	aid	to	foreigners	in	their	
negotiations	with	the	local	authorities,	even	at	a	time	when	to	do	so	meant	ostracism	
by	his	Japanese	friends	for	helping	potential	enemies.	
Wada	never	showed	himself	aggressive	nor	argumentative	and	was	unusually	
self-effacing,	even	for	a	Japanese.	We	point	this	out	because	if	he	has	seemed	to	have	
committed	war	crimes,	we	believe	that	this	very	timid	nature	would	make	him	readily	
follow	out	orders	which	he	would	shun	if	left	to	his	own	tendencies.	.	.	.
This	affidavit	is	presented	on	our	own	volition	in	certifying	to	the	many	years	of	
knowledge	concerning	Shusuke	Wada,	of	his	unimpeachable	character	during	that	
time,	and	his	helpfulness	to	English-speaking	people.	.	.	.	(Proceedings	of	a	Military	
Commission,	p.	844)
When	Wada	took	the	stand	toward	the	end	of	 the	trial,	we	 learned	that	he	had	gone	to	a	
business	school	in	Matsuyama,	worked	for	the	prefectural	government	for	about	ten	years,	then	for	
an	export-import	company	in	Kobe	for	about	five	years,	and	his	family	consisted	of	a	stepmother,	a	
wife,	and	two	children.	In	June	1942,	when	he	was	37	years	old,	he	had	gotten	a	 job	as	a	civilian	
translator	with	the	Imperial	 Japanese	Army.	In	several	references	 in	English,	 including	Weller	
(1945)	and	Glusman	(2005),	Wada	is	described	as	“a	hunchback.”	My	grandfather	never	mentioned	a	
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physical	deformity,	and	the	photograph	I	found	of	him	online	on	Yahoo!	Images,	probably	taken	at	
the	time	of	the	trial,	shows	him	from	the	front	seated	behind	a	desk	or	podium.	When	I	tried	to	
confirm	this	point	with	the	librarian	at	the	Military	Archives	at	the	National	Institute	for	Defense	
Studies	in	Tokyo,	I	received	a	very	polite	reply,	but	no	answer	to	my	question,	perhaps	because	this	
was	considered	a	breach	of	privacy.	Wada	testified	that	he	had	applied	for	the	position	of	interpreter	
with	the	Japanese	Imperial	Army,	and	it	is	possible	he	did	this	because	his	size	and	shape	may	have	
made	him	ineligible	for	the	draft,	which	was	taking	men	up	to	the	age	of	40	during	the	war.	
Wada	testified	that	he	had	not	refused	or	neglected	to	transmit	any	requests	for	“adequate	
quarters,	food,	drinking	water,	ventilation,	sanitation	and	hygienic	facilities,	medical	attention,	and	
reasonable	protection	from	the	hazards	of	war”	from	the	prisoners	of	war	to	Toshino,	his	superior	
officer	 (Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	792),	but	he	did	admit	 to	having	struck	some	
prisoners	as	punishment	(Specification	16	of	the	charges	against	him):
Q: 	There is one thing I want you to tell this Commission about. In Takao Harbor, I 
believe aboard the Enoura Maru, did you slap any prisoner of war?
A: Yes, there is one time. 
Q: Tell about it. 
A: 	While on the Enoura Maru the lower hold was loaded with sugar, and the prisoners of 
war were in the ‘tween deck. I went through these holds at various times and I was 
informed by the chief mate that the prisoners of war were stealing sugar. I think at that 
time Sergeant Hattori and Lieutenant Toshino were not aboard the ship that day. I 
told Colonel Beecher that the prisoners of war were stealing sugar and I was told by 
the chief mate. This was repeated several times. Later, Colonel Beecher told me that 
he would place a sentry by the sugar. But even though again the chief mate caught 
prisoners stealing sugar and informed me. Then I told Colonel Beecher again I was 
informed by the chief mate and was scolded again by the chief mate. However, this 
stealing of sugar was still continuing. There Colonel Beecher told me he could not do 
any more. I knew if this kept up the prisoners would be punished by the chief mate or 
the ship’s crew, and I knew that I did not have any authority to punish these prisoners 
of war but I called three prisoners of war who were caught by the chief mate and 
punished them by bringing them up to the hatch board and I made them sit there and 
told them if they were taken care of by the chief mate or other ship crew I did not know 
what type of punishment they would receive, therefore I did take it on my own and there 
I slapped each prisoner of war two times and made them sit there approximately thirty 
minutes. During this time I was straightening out these identification cards on top of 
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the hatch board with Pyzick. Later, when Lieutenant Toshino came back I informed 
him about the incident and he scolded me and also told me not to strike the prisoners 
of war. I know I made a mistake and the chief mate was satisfied.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	793)
This	story	is	similar	to	one	my	grandfather	told	in	his	manuscript.	That	incidence	of	stealing	
sugar	from	the	lower	hold	happened	on	the	Brazil	Maru	on	the	last	leg	of	the	journey	from	Takao	
Harbor,	Formosa,	to	Moji,	Japan.	In	that	case,	Wada	threatened	the	prisoners	with	withholding	food	
and	water	until	he	found	out	who	had	been	stealing	the	sugar.	The	two	prisoners	who	volunteered	
to	take	the	blame	had	to	stand	at	attention	for	a	 long	period	of	time	and	were	given	lectures	and	
beaten,	and	they	later	died,	but	my	grandfather	did	not	specify	who	actually	had	given	them	the	
physical	punishment.	
If	Wada	had	 sought	out	 the	 company	of	 foreigners	 in	Matsuyama	such	as	Dr.	Bunce,	
Lieutenant	Colonel	Lentz,	and	Dr.	and	Mrs.	Gulick	before	the	war,	he	must	have	been	somewhat	
unusual	for	his	time	and	place.	He	seems	to	have	gotten	along	well	with	the	foreign	community	in	
Matsuyama	before	the	war,	but	during	the	war,	as	an	interpreter	for	the	Imperial	Japanese	Army,	
he	seems	to	have	been	unable	to	establish	much	of	a	rapport	with	the	POWs.	
“Don’t	shoot	 the	messenger,”	meaning	one	should	not	blame	the	person	who	brings	bad	
news,	is	a	saying	known	to	most	speakers	of	English.	Essentially,	the	job	of	an	interpreter	is	to	be	a	
messenger	who	relays	news	and	information,	both	good	and	bad,	from	one	group	to	another	when	
they	do	not	share	a	common	language.	I	have	never	worked	as	an	official	interpreter,	but	as	a	part	of	
my	 job	at	universities	 in	Japan,	I	have	had	opportunities	to	act	as	a	 liaison	between	speakers	of	
Japanese	and	speakers	of	English	on	university	business,	and	I	have	learned	that	it	is	imperative	for	
the	person	acting	as	a	liaison	to	remain	calm	at	all	times.	It	has	sometimes	been	hard	work,	but	it	
has	never	involved	the	life-or-death	matters	that	an	interpreter	would	experience	during	wartime,	
and	I	have	always	been	able	to	rest	at	the	end	of	the	day.	I	try	to	put	myself	in	Wada’s	shoes	in	that	
situation―one	 interpreter	versus	a	group	of	bruised,	battered,	weary,	starving,	 frustrated,	and	
angry	men	who	knew	about	the	provisions	for	prisoners	of	war	laid	out	in	the	Geneva	Convention	
and	were	helplessly	watching	their	fellow	POWs	die	in	increasing	numbers,	with	imperfect	language	
skills,	no	downtime,	and	only	pressure	from	his	superior	to	get	something	done	in	an	 impossible	
situation―and	as	jobs	go,	I	can	only	imagine	how	stressful	it	must	have	been.	I	agree	with	Colonel	
Lentz	 that	Wada	must	have	been	 in	a	“hell	of	a	situation,”	but	he	clearly	stepped	outside	 the	
standard	job	description	of	an	interpreter	by	raising	his	hand	against	the	POWs.	
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8. Death certificates
In	both	his	manuscript	and	in	his	official	deposition,	my	grandfather	mentioned	the	more	than	1,000	
death	certificates	with	 the	 individual’s	name,	 rank,	and	date	of	death	written	 in	English,	but	
everything	else	written	only	in	Japanese,	that	he	was	required	to	sign	a	few	days	after	their	arrival	
in	Moji,	Japan.	At	the	beginning	of	the	trial,	on	March	13,	1947,	his	affidavit	about	these	death	
certificates	was	received	in	evidence	as	Prosecution’s	Exhibit	No.	58.	Later	in	the	trial,	however,	
the	testimony	of	Dr.	Schwartz	revealed	the	existence	of	other	death	certificates	as	well:
Q: By the way, while you were on the tennis court did you sign any death certificates?
A: 	On one occasion Mr. W ada brought a stack of death certificates. The number of which 
I would guess to be 250 and gave them to me to be signed in blank, which I did. . . . 
Q: W as that the only time that you signed death certificates prior to arrival at Moji?
A: Yes. 
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	361)
After	arrival	in	Moji,	Dr.	Schwartz	was	asked	to	sign	another	stack	of	death	certificates:		
Q: About this time did you sign any death certificates? “Yes” or “No”.
A: 	Mr. W ada, accompanied by some Japanese guard, brought over to me approximately 
1,000 plain death certificates with instructions for me to sign them. I started in signing 
them and it was his idea that I was signing them too slowly and he removed about half 
of them and took them over to Major Williams, also in the Medical Corps, who signed 
the remainder.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	372)
In	the	cross	examination	of	Dr.	Schwartz	the	topic	of	death	certificates	came	up	again:	
Q: 	Now, at Moji, I believe you stated you signed about 500 death certificates and Major 
Williams signed the other 500; is that correct?
A: That is correct.
Q: W ere those the only death certificates signed at Moji?
A: To the best of my knowledge they were.
Q: Now, were you the senior medical officer among the prisoners of war?
A: 	At the time of our departure from Manila, Colonel Craig and Colonel Sullivan were 
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both senior to me. When we arrived at Moji, Colonel Craig had already died and 
Colonel Sullivan was in a very critical condition and died a few days later.
Q: 	Do you have any explanation as to why you neglected in your affidavit of September 16, 
1945, mentioning these death certificates?
A: 	I think I have previously explained that ― the affidavit I submitted is not a very 
detailed account of our trip.
Q: 	I have in my hand Prosecution’s Exhibit No. 58, made by Lieutenant Commander 
Carey Miller Smith, on the last page of which he states, “As senior surviving naval 
medical officer at the hospital, I was required to sign more than 1,000 death certificates 
which were brought to me by Mr. W ada, which certificates were written in Japanese.” 
To your knowledge, did Lieutenant Commander Carey Miller Smith sign any death 
certificates?
A: 	This is the first I have heard of that incident. Of course, Commander Smith and I were 
at different camps.
Q: 	I have in my hand some 1,000 death certificates all of which were signed by 
Commander Smith and which were filed with the Prisoner of W ar Information 
Bureau; do you have any explanation to make as to why you would be required together 
with Major Williams to sign 1,000 of the certificates when these certificates were the 
ones which were filed with the Prisoner of W ar Information Bureau? . . . 
A: 	I can’t explain that. The thousand death certificates, approximately a thousand that 
Major Williams and I signed were not the type death certificates as I see there. The 
ones we signed were about probably one and a half times that size, were a printed 
form, were printed in English, and were signed in blank. There was no Japanese 
writing on them. 
Q: 	Then as I understand it, you are not able to state whether any official use was made by 
Mr. W ada or Lieutenant T oshino of the certificates signed by you and Major 
Williams.
A: That is correct.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	pp.	386-387)
One	 last	point	about	the	death	certificates	 is	the	discrepancy	between	the	cause	of	death	
listed	on	them	in	Japanese	and	the	actual	cause	of	death	as	remembered	by	Dr.	Schwartz.	He	was	
recalled	to	the	stand	at	a	later	time	during	the	trial	and	asked	to	look	at	a	list	of	names	of	prisoners	
of	war	who	had	died	during	the	 journey	from	the	Philippines	to	Japan.	He	was	asked	to	 find	the	
names	of	men	he	knew	personally	and	whose	cause	of	death	he	could	confirm.	An	interpreter	then	
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read	the	cause	of	death	listed	on	the	death	certificates	for	these	men	so	they	could	be	compared.	
Here	is	one	example:	
A: 	This is the death certificate of Portz, W arner P; he was a commander; I know he died 
on the Enoura Maru, approximately 6 January 1945 of dysentery, of malnutrition, and 
dehydration.
Q: Will the interpreter now state what the certificate states?
Q: 	Look at it and see what the cause of death is as entered there on that death certificate – 
the purported cause of death.
Interpreter: According to this death certificate it shows that Commander Portz, W arner 
P. United States Navy, had died of wounds received from bombing – bomb shrapnel; 
died aboard the Enoura Maru, the date, 7 January 1945. 
Q: 	Is that signed by some Japanese official?
Interpreter: It does not bear any Japanese official’s name, just the signature of 
Commander Smith.
(Proceedings	of	a	Military	Commission	p.	402)
Death	certificates	for	a	total	of	thirteen	men	were	examined,	all	with	discrepancies	as	to	the	
cause	of	death.	Among	the	names	were	Eugene	Specht,	who	arm	was	amputated	by	Dr.	Schwartz	
on	the	tennis	court	 in	Olongapo,	and	Ulysses	J.	L.	Peoples,	 Jr.,	who	had	been	executed	at	 the	
cemetery	in	San	Fernando,	Pampanga,	in	December	1944,	and	for	both	men	the	cause	of	death	was	
listed	as	“wounds	received	in	the	bombing	of	the	Oryoku	Maru.”	Enough	about	death	certificates.	
9. The verdict
All	charges	against	Captain	Kajiyama	Shin,	 the	ship	master	of	 the	Brazil	Maru,	were	dropped	
midway	through	the	trial	on	April	9,	1947,	when	the	Prosecution	finished	its	case.	On	the	morning	
of	May	9,	1947,	at	Yokohama	courthouse,	the	findings	against	the	other	eight	men	were	read:
◦　	Toshino	Junsaburo	-	18	specifications;	guilty	of	9.	Sentence:	to	be	hanged	by	the	neck	until	
dead.
◦　	Aihara	Kazutane	-	5	specifications;	guilty	of	4.	Sentence:	to	be	hanged	by	the	neck	until	dead.
◦　	Wada	Shusuke	-	16	specifications;	guilty	of	8.	Sentence:	to	be	confined	at	hard	 labor	for	the	
term	of	his	natural	life.	
◦　	Tanoue	Suketoshi	 -	1	specification;	guilty	of	1.	Sentence:	 to	be	confined	at	hard	 labor	 for	
83
War	Stories	(5):	Judgment	at	Yokohama	(March	10	―	May	9,	1947)
twenty-five	years.
◦　	Ueda	Jiro	-	1	specification;	guilty	of	1.	Sentence:	to	be	confined	at	hard	labor	for	twenty	years.
◦　	Hattori	Sho	-	4	specifications;	guilty	of	1.	Sentence:	to	be	confined	at	hard	labor	for	ten	years.
◦　	Kobayashi	Risaku	-	1	specification;	not	guilty	of	1.	No	sentence.
◦　Yoshida	Hisao	-	1	specification;	not	guilty	of	1.	No	sentence.
In	the	testimony	at	this	trial,	 it	was	noted	that	Lieutenant	Urabe,	who	had	worked	under	
General	Kou,	the	main	camp	commandant	in	Manila,	and	delivered	the	order	to	Toshino	about	the	
execution	of	 the	15	POWs	at	San	Fernando,	Pampanga,	 in	December	1944,	was	already	dead.	I	
asked	the	librarian	at	the	Military	Archives	of	the	National	Institute	for	Defense	Studies	in	Tokyo	
where,	when,	and	how	he	died,	but	was	politely	told	 that	 this	 information	could	only	be	made	
available	to	family	members;	as	with	my	question	about	Wada,	it	was	considered	a	privacy	issue.	In	
the	 testimony,	 it	 also	 came	out	 that	 at	 another	 trial,	 in	March	1946,	General	Kou	had	been	
sentenced	to	death	by	hanging	for	having	ordered	the	transfer	of	this	draft	of	approximately	1,619	
American	prisoners	of	war	 from	 the	Philippine	 Islands	 to	 Japan	and	 failing	 in	his	duties	 and	
responsibilities	to	protect	them	from	mistreatment,	abuse,	neglect,	and	the	hazards	of	war.
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